How the attack works
An application calls the Hub pull function for a prompt identified as owner/name, with the include_model option turned on. The Hub server returns a manifest, and LangChain's loading logic uses that manifest to build a live model client, not just plain text. Because the manifest can set the client's base URL, headers, and other constructor arguments, a prompt owned by someone outside the organization can silently point the client at an attacker-controlled endpoint. Any request the app sends through that client — including API keys or prompt contents — travels to that endpoint instead of the intended provider. There is no built-in trust check separating an organization's own prompts from public ones; the request looks the same either way.
Why it matters
Traffic and secrets meant for a legitimate LLM provider can be redirected to an attacker's server (SSRF), leaking API keys and prompt contents, and the attacker's prompt/model settings can silently change how the AI agent behaves.
What you can do
- Restrict which Hub owner handles your applications are allowed to pull prompts from, and reject anything not matching your own workspace.
- Avoid using include_model / include_model=true unless you control and trust the prompt owner; fetch prompt text only when possible.
- Review existing code for pull_prompt/pull_prompt_commit or pullPrompt/pullPromptCommit calls and check the owner segment on each.
- Log and periodically audit Hub pull requests, flagging any where the owner is not your organization's handle.
Known benign look-alikes
- First-party use - an application pulling its own organization's prompt by the fully qualified "owner/name" handle with include_model=True. The request is byte-identical to the attack; triage by checking whether the owner segment is your workspace handle. This is the dominant expected FP and the reason the rule reports rather than blocks.
- Deliberate evaluation or benchmarking jobs that pull well-known community Hub prompts (rag-prompt, react-chat, etc.) as part of a prompt-comparison harness.
- Developer prototyping in notebooks or scratch scripts against public Hub prompts before the prompt is forked into the organization's own workspace.
- CI regression suites that pin a third-party prompt commit hash to detect upstream drift.
- Documentation, tutorial or SDK-integration-test traffic replaying example URLs (largely suppressed by filter_templated_identifier and filter_placeholder_tokens).