How the attack works
A session running mcp-bifrost delegates an edit task to a worker process. Instead of confining changes to the scoped task, the worker's writes land on sensitive files: CI/CD workflow definitions, git or husky hooks, dependency manifests and lockfiles, container entrypoints, the validation-gate configs meant to catch bad edits, secrets, or files used for shell/agent persistence. The detection looks for one write to a high-trust surface plus a second, independent suspicious signal (another sensitive surface, secret material, or an unusually wide set of files touched) within a 15-minute window, rather than flagging every edit.
Why it matters
An attacker who manipulates the worker model can get their changes silently applied with the primary agent's trust - potentially disabling CI checks, planting persistence, or exfiltrating secrets - without the diff itself ever being inspected by this detection.
What you can do
- Restrict which files an automated code-editing worker is allowed to write, especially CI configs, git hooks, dependency lockfiles, container entrypoints, and secret stores.
- Require human review or a separate approval step before any automated edit touches validation-gate configs or CI/CD definitions.
- Keep dependency install steps isolated from arbitrary file-write permissions so a compromised worker can't piggyback edits on top of routine installs.
- Log and periodically audit what files delegated worker processes actually write, independent of whether edits pass validation gates.
Known benign look-alikes
- A developer legitimately asks mcp-bifrost to add or edit a CI workflow, Dockerfile, Makefile or git hook. Mitigated by requiring a second independent evidence class - a single expected surface edit is not reported.
- Dependency installation (npm/yarn/pnpm install, pip/poetry install, bundle install) rewriting a lockfile or manifest during a bifrost session. This yields one evidence class only, because writes under vendored dependency and cache trees are not counted.
- Large legitimate refactors or codegen runs that touch many files. Volume alone is never sufficient - an execution-trust, gate-config or persistence write is required.
- Repository bootstrap or scaffolding tasks ("set up CI and pre-commit for this repo") which intentionally touch a workflow file and a validator config together. Expected to be reported; report-only so no work is blocked.
- Local .env / .npmrc edits performed by the developer's own editor process. Only writers inside the resolved bifrost process session are considered; sample and template env files are ignored.