How the attack works
An agent fetches or ingests content from a public, non-trusted host - a webpage, README, or similar. Within the same session, the agent (or something in its process lineage) spawns a network-capable tool such as curl, python, or a similar interpreter. That subprocess then makes an outbound HTTP request or network connection, either back to the same host that supplied the original instructions, or to a public destination that had never been contacted before the instructions were ingested. All three steps must happen in order within a 15-minute window for this to trigger.
Why it matters
If the ingested content is actually malicious, this chain describes how an agent can be manipulated into exfiltrating data to an attacker-controlled host or fetching further payloads - without any traditional exploit or vulnerability being involved. This rule only flags this specific ordered pattern; it does not confirm data was stolen or identify the source of the malicious instructions.
What you can do
- Review agent sessions where this pattern fires to confirm whether the subprocess and destination are expected, since routine package installs and doc-driven workflows commonly match this shape.
- Restrict which hosts an agent is allowed to fetch instructions or content from, especially before it is permitted to spawn subprocesses with network access.
- Isolate or sandbox agent-spawned subprocesses so they cannot reach arbitrary external destinations without separate approval.
- Log and monitor the full lineage of agent-spawned processes so investigators can distinguish agent-issued commands from human-typed ones in the same terminal.
Known benign look-alikes
- Coding agent reads a public install guide or README, then a package manager or setup script spawned in the same session curls a release artifact from the same host or from a registry endpoint first contacted during that window. This is the dominant benign match and the reason the rule is report-only.
- Computer-use / browsing agents that ingest a public page and then use a subprocess-based HTTP client (curl, python-requests via `python -c`) against that same site's API instead of the in-process fetcher.
- Developer typing an unrelated `curl`/`python` in the same terminal that is an ancestor of the agent, within 15 minutes of the agent fetching an external doc -- lineage cannot distinguish a human-typed command from an agent-issued one.
- Degraded lineage. When an ancestor shell was never ingested, proc_lineage stops early and a sibling's exec/egress may be attributed to this session. Window clustering limits but does not eliminate this; treat a short lineage in the chain as best-effort attribution.
- First run on a new machine or after a graph reset, where every destination is "novel" because first_seen for all URL/Host nodes post-dates the anchor.