# Malicious Go init() Function Spawning a Process via a Code-Generation Tool

- **Severity:** Critical
- **Signature ID:** `4deaa057-5625-4e4d-8230-5c5b152d7016`
- **CVEs:** CVE-2026-48787
- **MITRE ATLAS:** AML.T0053 (AI Agent Tool Invocation)
- **OWASP:** ASI02 (Tool Misuse and Exploitation), LLM05 (Improper Output Handling)

## Summary

An attacker submits Go source code to an AI-powered code-generation tool. The code contains a func init() that spawns a process — a Go feature that runs automatically the instant the package loads, no user interaction needed. When the tool later builds or restarts using that source, the attacker's command executes.

## How the attack works

The attacker gets access to a code-generation feature in an AI development tool and submits Go source containing a func init() body. Inside that init() they place a call like os.StartProcess, exec.Command, or syscall.Exec. The attacker then triggers a build, rebuild, or service restart on that tool. Because init() runs the moment the compiled package loads, the process-spawning call executes immediately with no further action needed. This was first documented in gin-vue-admin, where an authenticated user injected code via one API endpoint and triggered a rebuild via another, causing calc.exe to launch, but the underlying pattern applies to any tool that compiles or loads attacker-supplied Go source without reviewing it.

## Why it matters

An attacker who can submit code to an AI code-generation feature gains arbitrary command execution on the server or environment that builds and runs that code, effectively turning a development convenience feature into a remote code execution path.

## What you can do

- Require human review of any AI-generated or AI-submitted Go source before it is compiled or deployed, especially init() functions.
- Restrict who can access code-generation and build/restart endpoints in internal developer tools; treat them as privileged actions.
- Run code-generation build/compile steps in an isolated, sandboxed environment with no access to sensitive systems.
- Scan generated source for process-spawning calls (os.StartProcess, exec.Command, syscall.Exec) inside init() before allowing a build to proceed.

## Known benign look-alikes

- A legitimate CLI wrapper's init() that re-execs itself under a different UID or namespace -- rare but real; still worth a human check given how uncommon and high-impact process-spawning init() functions are
- Discussion/documentation showing this exact code pattern as a security example, without it being submitted to an actual code-generation/build tool

## References

- https://agentthreatrule.org/en/rules/ATR-2026-02194
- https://github.com/flipped-aurora/gin-vue-admin/security/advisories/GHSA-22cv-9jv2-6m62
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48787

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Source: https://www.netzilo.com/threats/atr-malicious-go-init-function-spawning-a-process-via-a-code-gen