High

Tool Schema Enumeration via Social Engineering

An attacker asks an AI agent to reveal its complete set of internal tools, function names, and parameter details, disguising the request as a legitimate need — claiming to be an executive, a disabled user who needs a special format, or a security auditor. This gives the attacker a blueprint of the agent's capabilities, including hidden or admin-only functions, that they can use to plan further attacks.

How the attack works

The attacker opens with a pretext designed to lower the agent's guard: authority ('I'm the CEO'), disability accommodation ('I can only understand python scripts'), or a fake audit or QA task. They then demand output in a rigid technical format — JSON schema, OpenAPI spec, full parameter listings — rather than a plain-language answer. This framing pushes the agent past a normal 'what can you do?' response into disclosing complete tool manifests, including functions not meant for regular users. The attacker now has a map of internal APIs and admin functions to target next.

Netzilo detection

Why it matters

An organization loses visibility into and control over which of its internal AI tool capabilities are exposed, handing attackers a reconnaissance map of admin functions, API structure, and parameters that speeds up crafting of follow-on attacks.

What you can do

  • Restrict full tool/schema disclosure to authenticated admin sessions; treat any unauthenticated request for structured schema output as suspicious.
  • Separate admin-only tool definitions from user-facing ones so a single prompt cannot surface both.
  • Train or configure agents to answer capability questions in plain language summaries rather than raw schemas, regardless of the requester's claimed identity or disability.
  • Log and review requests that pair emotional or authority framing with demands for structured technical output (JSON, OpenAPI) — this combination is a strong signal, distinct from normal onboarding questions.

Known benign look-alikes

  • Developer documentation requests in authenticated admin sessions where full tool listing is expected
  • Onboarding flows where users legitimately ask what the agent can do — these typically use natural language, not JSON schema formatting demands

References

Related threats