How the attack works
An attacker first needs the kairos-core-mcp server running as a stdio subprocess in the target environment (that step is not covered here). Once running, if the server process — or something injected into it — spawns a child matching a high-risk pattern (curl/wget/nc/socat/scp for network egress, mkfifo for reverse shells, inline interpreters like python -c or powershell -enc, base64/openssl decoders, or persistence commands like crontab/launchctl), the rule flags it. It confirms the parent process is genuinely a kairos-core-mcp instance by checking its path or command line, then looks only at that process's own children within a short time window, so unrelated activity elsewhere on the host does not trigger it.
Why it matters
If exploited, this pattern indicates a step where a compromised or malicious MCP server package is executing commands beyond its normal function — potentially downloading further payloads, opening remote shells, decoding hidden code, or installing persistence. This gives an attacker a foothold inside an AI agent's execution environment.
What you can do
- Review any flagged command line immediately — legitimate tool calls (e.g. curl to fetch a schema) are easy to distinguish from attack primitives once you see the exact command.
- Pin and verify the kairos-core-mcp package version and source; avoid running it from unverified checkouts or editable installs in production.
- Restrict what the MCP server process is allowed to execute or reach on the network, using OS-level sandboxing or least-privilege service accounts.
- Treat this detection as one data point in an investigation, not proof of compromise — confirm whether the spawned command matches the package's documented tool behaviour before escalating.
Known benign look-alikes
- A kairos-core-mcp tool that legitimately shells out to curl or wget to fetch a document, schema or artefact as part of its advertised tool surface. The kill chain shows the exact command line so this is triaged in seconds.
- Editable / source installs where the package is executed straight from a checkout and its own build or test tooling spawns `python -c`, `chmod +x` or `base64 -d` during a first-run compile step.
- Developers debugging the server interactively (for example `python -m kairos_core_mcp` in a terminal, then invoking curl from a shell that the server itself spawned).
- A CI runner executing the packaged server where the surrounding job spawns scp/sftp for artefact upload from inside the server's process subtree.
- Any future rename of the distribution that keeps the module name will still match on `kairos_core_mcp`; a genuinely unrelated project using that module name would be attributed to this rule.