# Supply Chain IOC - npm Package @vibekiln/slopburn-cli-staging

- **Severity:** Medium
- **Signature ID:** `3f9c1e2a-7b64-4d81-9a05-c6e2f8b31d47`
- **MITRE ATLAS:** AML.T0010 (AI Supply Chain Compromise)
- **OWASP:** LLM03 (Supply Chain)

## Summary

This detection watches for one named npm package that has been flagged as suspicious. It fires when that exact package name (or its binary) shows up in an install or run command, but it does not confirm what the package actually does.

## How the attack works

An attacker (or a developer, knowingly or not) runs npm, npx, pnpm, yarn, or bun to install or execute the package @vibekiln/slopburn-cli-staging. This can happen via a direct install command, a lifecycle script running under node_modules for that package, a packed tarball install, or by directly invoking the slopburn-cli binary. The detection matches the literal package name or binary name appearing in the command line — including URL-encoded or packed-tarball forms — nothing more.

## Why it matters

If this package is malicious, having it installed or executed in your environment means untrusted code has run with whatever permissions the install process had, potentially including build pipelines or developer machines. The rule only confirms the package's presence or use; it does not tell you what it did once installed.

## What you can do

- Block or pin dependencies so this package name cannot be silently added to a project.
- If you find it installed, treat the affected host or pipeline as compromised until you've reviewed what the package's install scripts and binary actually do.
- Search your lockfiles, node_modules trees, and SBOMs for this exact package name to check for prior exposure.
- Remove the package and rotate any credentials or tokens available to the process that installed or ran it.

## Known benign look-alikes

- Incident responders or SOC analysts grepping lockfiles, node_modules trees or SBOMs for this IOC (grep/rg/osv-scanner/trivy/syft/semgrep) - suppressed by filter_triage.
- Read-only registry triage of the package (npm view / npm info / npm search / yarn info) and remediation (npm uninstall / npm remove) - suppressed by filter_triage. Note "uninstall" does not satisfy the \binstall\b word boundary, so removal does not re-trigger the rescue branch.
- Dependency resolution dry runs (--dry-run) performed while assessing the package.
- A developer who legitimately depends on this package if it is later confirmed benign; the rule only reports, so no build or agent action is interrupted.
- A CI job whose command line embeds a threat-intel feed or this rule file as an argument; the file-viewer clause of filter_triage covers the common cat/head/less cases.

## References

- https://www.npmjs.com/package/@vibekiln/slopburn-cli-staging
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001/
- https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0010
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm032025-supply-chain/

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Source: https://www.netzilo.com/threats/npm-slopburn-cli-staging-ioc