# OpenClaw Suspicious File Write to Sensitive Paths (EDR Graph)

- **Severity:** High
- **Signature ID:** `db43664e-2408-5e70-9b63-dcb0fabc8c5f-p`
- **MITRE ATLAS:** AML.T0053 (AI Agent Tool Invocation), AML.T0081 (Modify AI Agent Configuration)
- **OWASP:** ASI02 (Tool Misuse and Exploitation), ASI07 (Unsafe Autonomous Code Execution)

## Summary

An AI agent (or a subprocess it spawned) writes to sensitive file paths on disk. This particular check catches writes that only show up in operating-system level monitoring, meaning they were made by a subprocess or in a way that bypassed the agent's own tool-call logging.

## How the attack works

An AI agent framework normally logs the files it writes to through its own hooks or a proxy that watches its tool calls. If the agent spawns a subprocess, or otherwise writes to disk outside that logged path, those writes are invisible to the agent-level logging. This rule instead watches file-write activity captured by endpoint detection and response (EDR) at the operating-system syscall level, and checks every 30 seconds for writes landing in sensitive paths. Because it works from OS-level telemetry, it can catch file writes that the agent's own instrumentation missed.

## Why it matters

Sensitive files (configuration, credentials, system paths, etc.) can be modified or overwritten by an AI agent's subprocess without leaving a trace in the agent's own audit logs, letting the write go unnoticed until this OS-level check runs.

## What you can do

- Restrict the filesystem permissions available to accounts or containers that run AI agents, so writes to sensitive paths fail regardless of which process attempts them.
- Run AI agents in a sandboxed or containerized environment where subprocess file access is limited and monitored.
- Cross-check agent-level tool-call logs against OS-level file activity logs to spot gaps where subprocess actions are not being captured.
- Review any confirmed writes to sensitive paths to determine whether they came from the agent's intended actions or from an unexpected spawned process.

## References

- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/

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Source: https://www.netzilo.com/threats/openclaw-suspicious-file-write-periodic