PyPI Supply Chain Acquisition - minia-telegram
This rule flags attempts to download or install a Python package called minia-telegram, or names that look like typosquats of it, using common tools like pip, pipx, uv, poetry, pdm or conda. The package is suspected to be trojanized, meaning it may run malicious code during installation.
How the attack works
An attacker or an unwitting developer runs a package-manager command naming minia-telegram or a lookalike name, or installs it directly from a wheel, sdist, or version-control URL. The rule ties this action to the exact process and session that triggered it, then watches that same session for 15 minutes for follow-up activity: repeated install attempts, execution of build/install hooks (setup.py, egg_info, bdist_wheel, pep517) which is where a malicious sdist can run arbitrary code, and any download or decode utilities launched alongside the install.
Netzilo detection
Netzilo reports this behaviour when it is observed.
- Signature ID
- 7b3f1c2e-9d4a-4f61-b8e5-2a6c0d5e94f7
- Severity
- High
Why it matters
If the package is genuinely trojanized, installing it can execute attacker code on the machine during setup, giving them a foothold before anyone inspects the dependency. This rule only reports the acquisition and related install-time activity - it does not block the install or trace effects beyond the triggering process's own lineage.
What you can do
- →Block or quarantine minia-telegram and close variants in your internal package index or proxy until verified safe.
- →Review any host or CI job that recently installed this package for unexpected build-hook execution or outbound network activity.
- →Pin dependencies and verify package names carefully in requirements files to catch typosquats before install.
- →If found, isolate the affected environment, inspect setup.py/build hooks for injected code, and rotate any credentials that were reachable from that machine or session.
Known benign look-alikes
- Security researcher or incident responder deliberately fetching the package for analysis in a sandbox (e.g. "pip download minia-telegram"). The rule reports so the analyst action is auditable rather than obstructed.
- An organisation that publishes its own vetted internal fork named minia-telegram to a private index - the install still reports, and the non-default-package-source corroborator will be present.
- CI dependency-audit or SBOM tooling that shells out with the package name in the command line while pinning or resolving a requirements file.
- Reinstall after remediation. Plain "pip uninstall"/"remove" with no acquisition verb is filtered out in the script and does not report.
- Typosquat-tolerant matching (minai-, minnia-, mnia-, -telegramm) could match an unrelated project whose real name happens to fall inside the variant set.