# Suspicious npm Package @vibetonomy/agent-linux-x64 Execution

- **Severity:** Medium
- **Signature ID:** `3f1e9c2a-6b7d-4a1f-9c3e-8d2b5a7f1e64`
- **MITRE ATLAS:** AML.T0010 (AI Supply Chain Compromise)
- **OWASP:** LLM05 (Improper Output Handling)

## Summary

This detects command lines that install, download, or run an npm package called @vibetonomy/agent-linux-x64. The name is built to look like a legitimate agent runtime binary, a common trick used to trick people into installing something malicious under a trusted-sounding name.

## How the attack works

An attacker publishes an npm package whose name imitates a real 'Vibetonomy agent' Linux x64 distribution. A victim, believing they are installing or running the legitimate agent runtime, types or scripts a command that names this package directly. The rule watches for that command line appearing on a system. It only sees the process command itself — it does not see whether npm actually resolved and downloaded the package, what the package did once running, or any network callback afterward.

## Why it matters

If real, this pattern lets an attacker get a victim to run an unvetted, attacker-controlled binary on their machine under the guise of a trusted agent tool, potentially leading to code execution and further compromise. There is no confirmed payload or CVE behind this specific package name — it is flagged only because the naming matches a known impersonation pattern.

## What you can do

- Check whether @vibetonomy/agent-linux-x64 is genuinely published by the vendor you expect, using the official Vibetonomy documentation or repository, not just the npm registry listing.
- If found in a dependency tree or lockfile, treat it as suspect until confirmed legitimate; do not run it.
- Review shell history and CI/CD logs for install or execute commands referencing this package name to determine if it actually ran.
- Restrict which registries and package sources your build systems can pull from, and require review of new dependencies before they are installed.

## Known benign look-alikes

- Security researchers or SOC analysts grepping/catting package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, or an SBOM to audit whether this package name is present anywhere in the dependency tree
- npm/pnpm/yarn metadata queries (npm view, npm info, npm audit, npm ls, npm why) run during dependency review that reference the package name without installing or executing it
- Remediation/removal commands (npm uninstall, npm rm, pnpm remove, yarn remove) that reference the package while cleaning up a suspected compromise
- CI/CD security scanners or SCA tools whose own command line embeds the package name as a known-bad string for detection/blocklist purposes

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Source: https://www.netzilo.com/threats/suspicious-npm-vibetonomy-package